The Hungarian Election Polls, the Day After

 

Hungarian Election polls, the Day After

Prepared by Claire Durand (Université de Montréal) and Tamás Bodor (University of Wisconsin)

Hi,

To follow on our post on Friday, here are our observations regarding the pollsters’ work for the Hungarian election. We examine the quality of the polls that were conducted during April.

1.      1. Let us notice that the pollsters who were considered close to the opposition or independent produced very good estimates in general. On average, there is only a 1.1 difference between the polls and the results of Tisza and 0.9 difference for Fidesz. Both parties were very slightly overestimated by these pollsters (see table below).

2.      2. Here is the table of the results, based on the official results available on Monday, April 13, 4PM. They are not likely to change much.

3.      3. However, three of these pollsters overestimated Tisza and underestimated Fidesz. Interestingly, two of these pollsters are the ones we referred to in our previous post – Medián and 21 Kutatóközpont – whose allocation of undecideds was not proportional and gave an advantage to Tisza over Fidesz. The “pure” proportional allocation would possibly have led to better estimates.

4.      4. We can hardly speak about the polls that were considered close to the government because none of them published any poll in April, besides one. The only pollster of this group who published a poll is the American pollster McLaughlin. It underestimated Tisza by 12.8 points and overestimated Fidesz by 6.2 points.  These numbers speak for themselves.

5.      5, The pollster Nézőpont, considered close to the government, issued a statement regarding its performance. It recognized that its estimates were not accurate and informed that it will analyse how it could explain the situation.

6.      6. In terms of modes of administration, only three pollsters used live phone interviews and one, in-person interviews (McLaughlin). The others used a mix of different modes (see table). Atlas Intel, a Brazilian pollster present in other electoral campaigns (U.S.A., France, at least), with usually good estimates, also appeared in this campaign. It uses a mode of administration it calls random digital recruitment, etc. It consists in recruiting respondents on the web through apps and web sites with whom the pollster has agreements. It has the advantage of randomness and being web-based.

Conclusion:

There were a few things going wrong in the polls for the Hungarian election. First, a major difference appeared in estimates almost uniquely based on the pollsters presumed affiliation. This is “not normal”. It means that there is likely some “tempering with data” based on hypotheses made on the voters’ behavior. The use of likely voter models that are not transparent is usually associated with such results, but we have never seen such a substantial difference.

We did not always have the necessary information to assess whether allocation of undecideds or likely voter models explained the differences between pollsters. In fact, the last published polls were even less transparent than the polls published before during the campaign.

Two situations are worth mentioning. First the government-leaning polls were much less transparent – three out of five did not inform on the proportion of undecideds and on the estimates before allocation of these undecideds. In addition, four out of five did not publish polls in April. These pollsters need to examine their methods and the information they provide. It is a good point that Nézőpont informs that it will do so.

Besides, among the opposition-leaning or independent pollsters, some estimates were clearly boosted in favor of Tisza. The good news is that we could notice it because the pollsters were transparent and presented their estimates before and after allocation of the undecideds. However, they did not provide this information for their polls published in April.

 

Best,

Claire Durand and Tamás Bodor.